OTTOMAN DELUSIONS,
TURKISH REALITIES
Turkey and her geopolitical context.
Turkey’s coup failed. Erdogan and his minions are back in control and,
predictably, they are doing so with a vengeance. I would be surprised if
Erdogan stopped before he has total and absolute control over the country, the
military, the security apparatus, the press and the judiciary and not until he
has purged, persecuted, jailed or otherwise neutralised every single opponent,
big or small, real or imaginary.
Besides the internal witch hunt, there is the geopolitical theatre in
which Turkey is inserted and one that presents important challenges for Ankara,
even more so after the failed coup. Here are the five most compelling
threats/risks Turkey will be facing:
1-
THE KURDS
a)
The Kurds of Turkey: the last iteration of the war
between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has been raging
with ferocity for a year. Erdogan broke the negotiated peace process for
domestic political gains (which he attained), but the Kurdish resistance has
been putting a determined fight against the Turkish Army, coupled with a spate
of terrorist attacks in Ankara and Istanbul. Plus, it is believed that the PKK
is receiving material support from Turkey’s opponents, such as Russia and Iran.
The use of a third generation MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence System),
probably a Russian/Soviet made SA-18, to shoot down a Turkish AH-1W Super Cobra
military helicopter raised some red flags given the accrued threat they
represent for aviation. Furthermore, the present prosecutorial environment in
Turkey will probably aggravate the repression on the Kurds, which in turn will
further radicalise a significant portion of the Kurdish population and swell
the ranks of the PKK. The more entangled Turkey gets with the PKK, the less
focus and capability she will have to deal with external challenges in Syria,
Iraq and elsewhere.
b)
The Kurds of Syria: the YPG, the military arm of the
Syrian Kurdish Party (PYD) is the star
of the Syrian War in 2016. Its fighting capabilities and battlefield success
caught the attention of both the United States and Russia and the consequent
material and training support mostly from the Americans, which regarded the YPG
as the last chance of supporting a militarily effective group in Syria. Of
course, pumped up with this support, the YPG kept up gaining territory in
Northern Syria, mostly from the Islamic State. This was great news for the US, but
terrible news for Turkey. In fact, the YPG managed to conquer and hold a
substantial sliver of territory next to Turkey, thus buttressing its importance
on the Syrian battlefield and its claim to (at least) an autonomous Kurdish
region within a future Syria. This is anathema for the Turks who have publicly
and repeatedly stated they would not tolerate such a development. However, with
the Americans giving the Kurds training, weapons, supplies and air support and
the Russians preventing a meaningful Turkish intervention in Syria, there is
only so much Ankara can do.
Turkey’s Kurdish nightmare.
2-
SYRIA
The course of events in Syria, starting back in 2011 up to 2016, has been
going awry for Turkey. First, the US consistently refused to condone or
implement Ankara’s main policies, such as a safe zone in Northern Syria and a
no-fly zone, not to mention a full-fledged military intervention. The former
would have enabled the Turkish to return many Syrian refugees to their home
country and to implant a physical presence in Syrian territory, namely of a
military nature and thus better influence events inside Syria.
The Turkish-supported rebel groups have always shown limited
capabilities, hardly a match for the Syrian Army, the Islamic State, or Jabhat
Al Nusra. Consequently, they did not achieve much in terms of advancing
Turkey’s interests in Syria.
Finally, the Russian intervention bolstered the Assad regime and limited
Turkey’s latitude to intervene. Outright Russian hostility following the Su-24 downing
basically left Turkey frozen out of any meaningful hands-on approach to the
Syrian War.
At the moment, despite all the fuss about her importance, Turkey is
basically an enabler in the Syrian War by providing a close air base (Incirlik)
from which the US, the UK and France launch air strikes into Syria. On the
other hand, her influence on the ground has been waning, paling in comparison
to that of Russia, the US and Iran.
Turkey’s
goal from the outset of the conflict in Syria back in 2011 has been to turn
Syria into an ally or a satellite state, something that is an increasingly
distant prospect. High goals, lots of bravado and
tough talk were matched by little resolve (compared to Iran’s commitment to
save Assad’s regime), poor involvement on the ground and too much reliance on
the hope that others (i.e. the US) would do the heavy lifting, all contributed
to the present situation: the Turks no
longer seek to achieve gains, rather they are struggling to avoid or even limit
their losses. This scathing appraisal sums up the status of Turkey’s Syrian
adventure.
The impact of the Russian intervention can be seen in the notorious
growth of the Government’s and the Kurds’ controlled territory in just 6
months.
3-
IRAQ
The situation in Iraq is not as vexing for Turkey as that of Syria. On
the one hand, Ankara has not invested nearly as much in Iraq. On the other
hand, Turkey’s involvement in Iraq is mostly directed to try to solve her own
Kurdish problem by co-opting the Iraqi Kurds. This strategy has brought mixed
results so far.
On the win side, Turkey has had a virtual free pass to intervene
militarily in Northern Iraq to pursue PKK fighters and to strike their
sanctuaries. Turkey even has some small semi-permanent bases in Iraqi
territory. Turkey has enjoyed the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG)
acquiescence of her activities in exchange for economic support, especially
serving as a conduit for the KRG’s illegal oil exports. Given the feuding
between the KRG and Baghdad and the collapse of oil prices, Arbil has been cash
strapped, not even being able to pay public servants’ and security forces’
salaries on time. This plays into Ankara’s hands since it increases the Kurds’
dependence on Turkey.
On the lose side, Turkey runs the risk of having to bear some of the
burden of sustaining a quasi-bankrupt ally. Even more serious is the risk of
getting too enmeshed with the booby-trapped world of Kurdish politics and
relations, where kinship, geography, clan and personal interests and outside
patrons and enemies generate shifting alliances, feuds and betrayals, of which
the 1990’s Iraqi Kurds civil war is the ultimate example. Finally, Turkey’s
involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan is generating increasing resentment in Baghdad
which has probably not evolved into outright hostility yet, due to the conflict
that has engulfed Iraq.
Iraq: torn by sectarian and ethnic hatred and foreign meddling.
4-
THE RIVALS
With Egypt mostly out of the picture, Saudi Arabia and Iran are Turkey’s
rivals in the quest for regional pre-eminence. This is one of the areas in
which Turkey’s internal turmoil is more likely to affect her ability to compete
abroad.
As of this moment, Iran has the
upper hand in the Syrian War, wields the greatest influence in Iraq and
sponsors Hezbollah, arguably the most powerful political-military organisation
in Lebanon.
Saudi
Arabia is the leading nation of the 6-country Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
she is an ally and financier of Egypt and Jordan and leads a multinational
military intervention in Yemen.
Turkey….well,
Turkey has no privileged ally, is nobody’s patron (except for the KRG), has no relevant foreign military deployment and has a close political
relationship with Qatar.
This suffices to demonstrate the décalage
in influence and power between Turkey and her rivals. Given the array of
internal challenges and threats she has to deal with in the near future, it is
highly unlikely that Turkey will be able to improve her disadvantaged situation
vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The GCC, Saudi Arabia’s closest allies.
The United States and Russia, in this order, are the most influential
powers from outside the Middle East. Others, like the United Kingdom and
France, regardless of their areas of influence, mostly follow the American
lead.
In military language and from a Turkish perspective, the US has been the
friend and Russia has been the foe. Actually, since the beginning of the Syrian
War, the friendship with the US has frayed and Russia, who was not a foe, ended
being openly hostile towards Turkey.
Although Washington and Ankara eventually managed to strike some
arrangements (the availability of the Incirlik air base being the most relevant
one), the goals and strategies have always been different and have been
diverging. Amongst the points of contention are issues such as a ground
intervention, a safe zone, a no-fly zone, the Kurds’ actions and status, the
Islamic State and even Assad’s (or Assad’s regime’s) fate. The crisis in Turkey
with the purges and the predictable trampling of human rights on a grand scale
will likely widen the gulf between the two NATO allies.
The past few weeks have shown steps being taken to mend the strained
relation between Russia and Turkey, starting with a significant apology sent to
Putin by Erdogan. However, even if the hostility subsides, Moscow’s and
Ankara’s goals in Syria are so far apart that there is very little room for
meaningful cooperation.
Russian air assets in Latakia, Northwestern Syria.
OTTOMAN DELUSION, TURKISH REALITY
The REAL Ottoman Empire in the
17 Century.
in “ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA”
at https://www.britannica.com/place/Ottoman-Empire/The-peak-of-Ottoman-power-1481-1566
Turkey’s geopolitical challenges and difficulties are only compounded by
the new reality brought about by the recent coup d’état. Although it failed,
the coup is having consequences that will reverberate for a long time and which
threaten to further polarise the country. Among them is a leadership focused on
rooting out every single shade of eventual dissent, the military torn by
fundamental fissions, ripped by dissent, inside mistrust and a purge, which in
turn will hamper the armed forces ability to operate effectively and promptly.
All these ingredients point to inward-looking political, military and
security establishments. If there happens to be a sudden burst of external activity
by the Turks, particularly if it is of a military nature, it will more likely
be motivated by the need to rally the population around the regime and against
some foreign bogey man, than out of a geopolitical imperative or a serious
security concern.
Gone
are the days when the AKP leadership nurtured goals of grandeur, seeking to
recreate some sort of neo-Ottoman Turkey, powerful, influential and determinant
across the Middle East. The Turkish government may emerge from the coup more
powerful internally. Turkey, however, is more cowed, friendless and disoriented
than she has been for quite some time.
The
Ottoman Empire retained a centuries-long hegemony over South Eastern Europe,
North Africa and the Middle East. Today’s Turkey struggles to cope with
internal challenges and battles external isolation. Turkey’s Ottoman delusion
of 2011, morphed into a stark Turkish reality in 2016.
