ONE STEP AHEAD
North Korean rocket launch: Relentlessly building a deterrent.
For years it has been assumed that North
Korea’s nuclear programme
was just a tool to be traded for acceptance, recognition and material
advantages from countries such as the United States and Japan. That was
certainly the case for some time and it could be still a secondary goal.
However, it is not the primary one. Not anymore.
In January 2016, some days after
North Korea’s 4th nuclear test, we published a post (“Threat or
Bluff”) here at Tempos Interessantes where we stated that Pyongyang’s nuclear
programme served a deterrence purpose, more of an insurance policy than a
bargaining chip.
Why does North Korea pursue a nuclear
weapons programme?
In two words, Power and Security. North Korea is surrounded by great powers,
some of which openly hostile to her, so she
views nuclear weapons as an insurance policy against an attack, or an attempt
at subversion and regime change.
Nevertheless, most officials and
analysts in North America and East Asia kept on with the old mantra, assuming
that if some measure of legitimacy and comfort were bestowed upon the North
Korean regime, Pyongyang would let go of its nukes.
By last Autumn, things started
to change. Former Asia expert at the George W. Bush administration, Victor Cha,
declared in September to the House Foreign Affairs Committee:
“Testing was once interpreted by pundits to
be an attention-getting effort for dialogue with the United States,” but “it
would be irresponsible today to adhere to such an interpretation”. In today’s
world, “North Korea is executing a
strategy designed to demonstrate a survivable nuclear deterrent before the
next US administration comes into office.” Cha
insisted that the North Korean government sought to acquire nuclear weapons for
the purpose of deterring its enemies.
Arguably even more relevant were
the declarations of James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, proffered
last October:
“I think the notion of getting the North Koreans to denuclearize is
probably a lost cause,” Clapper said at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York. “They are not
going to do that. That is their ticket to survival.”
“The best we could probably hope for is some sort of a cap, but they are
not going to do that just because we ask them. There’s going to have to be some
significant inducements.”
in “Japan
Times” at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/10/26/asia-pacific/clapper-says-push-get-pyongyang-shed-nuclear-arms-probably-lost-cause/#.WHzQ63nFaUk
Further reinforcing my point is
outgoing Secretary of State John Kerry’s strong denial that this is so. Given that Kerry mostly lives in an
alternative reality, his rebuttal is a strong confirmation of Tempos Interessantes’ post.
In the last few years, North Korea has mostly shunned any prospective
round of negotiations and she has not taken any meaningful initiative of
her own to engage in one. In the same period, North Korea has greatly intensified the pace of nuclear warheads’ and
missiles’ developing and testing. Pyongyang has pursued these programmes
weathering increasingly tough sanctions and isolation.
This is not the kind of effort to be thrown
away in exchange for oil, cereals and a treaty. It is a race for a WMD
insurance policy and it is not going away.
So, we are happy that the readers’ of Tempos Interessantes were privileged to
be offered this new vision of nuclear weapons’ role in North Korea’s foreign
and security policy nine months ahead of most people.~
TEMPOS INTERESSANTES, ONE STEP AHEAD!
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