31 março, 2015

O Fim da "Tranquilidade Agitada"



O FIM DA “TRANQUILIDADE AGITADA”



O Iémen em guerra.
in STRATFOR em www.Stratfor.com  

O Iémen é mais um dos protagonistas da dita “Primavera Árabe”, que trocou o autoritarismo pela balbúrdia e pela guerra. Não foi, obviamente, uma troca premeditada, mas o resultado, seja no Iémen, na Síria, ou no Egipto, não é surpreendente.

O Iémen tem um longo historial de guerras intestinas e de intervenções externas, começando no Império Otomano, prosseguindo com a Grã-Bretanha e o Egipto e desembocando na Arábia Saudita, para não mencionar ingerências como as dos Estados Unidos, União Soviética e Irão.

O país conseguiu viver um período relativamente longo daquilo que designaria, com boa vontade política e gramatical, “tranquilidade agitada” sob a governação de Ali Abdullah Saleh (1990-2012). Quando este abdicou em 2012, pressionado pelas convulsões da “Primavera Árabe”, o Iémen perdeu a figura que trouxe um módico de estabilidade através de um misto de autoritarismo centralizador, força bruta e habilidade negocial para encontrar um equilíbrio no labirinto religioso, sectário e tribal do Sudoeste da Península Arábica.

O seu sucessor e seu antigo vice-presidente, Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi não tem o mesmo poder e capacidade negocial, mostrando-se incapaz de manter o país estável e de conter os principais focos de instabilidade. A percepção de fraqueza e vulnerabilidade motiva os predadores e foi isso que despoletou o ataque militar dos Al-Houthi, que passaram de uma luta localizada na sua região de Saada no Noroeste do país, para um movimento libertador e/ou de conquista da maior parte do território iemenita.

Desprovido do apoio de boa parte das forças militares e de segurança que permaneceram leais a Ali Saleh, que se terá aliado aos Al-Houthi, Hadi viu os rebeldes tomar a capital Sanaa em Setembro e ficou, virtualmente, na posição de Presidente-refém.

Com o fracasso de sucessivas tentativas de entendimento, Hadi demitiu-se no final de Janeiro. Dias mais tarde recuou, mas já era tarde; demitido ou em funções, o seu controlo sobre o Iémen e a respectiva governação era pouco diferente de zero. Remetido a prisão domiciliária primeiro, conseguiu refugiar-se em Aden. A recente ofensiva Al-Houthi sobre a cidade obrigou-o a esconder-se e a fugir para a Arábia Saudita, provavelmente sob protecção de forças especiais sauditas.

Perante a vaga Al-Houthi, a Arábia Saudita decidiu intervir militarmente no Iémen à frente de uma coligação de 10 países islâmicos no que é, até agora, uma campanha de bombardeamentos aéreos. Como é habitual, tal deverá revelar-se insuficiente, pelo que as principais questões que se põem agora são:

* Conseguirão os Al-Houthi manter a sua ofensiva até agora vitoriosa e imparável?
            * Que papel desempenhará Ali Saleh e ao lado de quem?
            * Até onde estarão os Sauditas dispostos a ir para atingir os seus objectivos?

Certo é que a “tranquilidade agitada” acabou há 4 anos. A balbúrdia e a guerra tomaram o seu lugar. Tal é a ordem do dia no Médio Oriente.



P.S. Em 3 de Outubro de 2014, terminei o post DE 2 FEZ-SE 1, DE 1 FAZ-SE 4
E 4 = 0 (http://tempos-interessantes.blogspot.pt/2014/10/de-2-fez-se-1-de-1-faz-se-4-e-4-0.html ) com a frase que se tem provado cada vez mais real:

“Enquanto os múltiplos players se preparam para os próximos confrontos, o Iémen que já foram 2 (1967-1990), dos quais se fez 1 (1990), está feito em 4. Neste caso, 4 = 0!”



29 março, 2015

Petraeus, Me and Iraq



PETRAEUS, ME AND IRAQ


 General David Petraeus at a press briefing in 2007, at the height of the Surge in Iraq.


Tempos Interessantes has been defending throughout 2014 up to now that the (mostly) American intervention against the Islamic State is geopolitical mistake. The main point I have made is that the Islamic State is mostly a threat to Syria and Iraq. These states are, at best, Iran’s closest allies; at worst, they are Iran’s proxies. They are surely dependent upon Iran.

In turn, Iran is the most serious threat in the Middle East, namely to Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Gulf States and even Turkey. Conversely, being a threat to American allies in the Middle East, Tehran is a threat to the United States’ interests too.

Reading a very interesting and rather candid interview by General David Petraeus, the architect of the 2007/08 Surge that turned the tide of the Iraq War, to the “Washington Post” (Petraeus: The Islamic State isn’t our biggest problem in Iraq at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/03/20/petraeus-the-islamic-state-isnt-our-biggest-problem-in-iraq/?wpisrc=nl_headlines&wpmm=1 ) I found quite a few of my views validated by a man with great on the ground knowledge and experience of Iraq and the Middle East.

The complete pullout of American troops from Iraq in 2011 spelled trouble from the beginning. First, the decision stemmed not from an evaluation of the situation on the ground, but from Barack Obama’s urge “to end a war” which was effectively long over (Obama’s Wars - 1 A Guerra que Já Não Era, 08/02/2012 at http://tempos-interessantes.blogspot.pt/2012/02/obamas-wars-guerra-que-ja-nao-o-era-com.html . He actually just facilitated its return.

This decision was preceded and compounded by another serious mistake: condoning and suporting Maliki’s continuation in the premiership after loosing the 2010 elections and after having already betrayed autoritarian and sectarian tendencies. Maliki went deep down that path after 2011: Passa-se, finalmente, que o regime sectário, autoritário, persecutório e corrupto de Maliki é a principal causa da guerra que assola o Iraque. Neste momento, Nouri Al Maliki é o cancro que importa erradicar e os seus dias estão contados. Vai com 4 anos de atraso, que representaram um enorme malefício para o Iraque e os Iraquianos.” (Maliki Out, 20/06/2014 at http://tempos-interessantes.blogspot.pt/2014/06/maliki-out.html

David Petraeus denounces both mistakes. His indictment of the US withdrawal is understandably mild but very perceptive. His indictment of Nouri Al Maliki is clear cut and definitive – he was a catastrophe that befell Iraq.

What has happened in Iraq is a tragedy — for the Iraqi people, for the region and for the entire world. It is tragic foremost because it didn't have to turn out this way. The hard-earned progress of the Surge was sustained for over three years.  What transpired after that, starting in late 2011, came about as a result of mistakes and misjudgements whose consequences were predictable. And there is plenty of blame to go around for that.

The proximate cause of Iraq’s unravelling was the increasing authoritarian, sectarian and corrupt conduct of the Iraqi government and its leader after the departure of the last U.S. combat forces in 2011. The actions of the Iraqi prime minister undid the major accomplishment of the Surge. [They] alienated the Iraqi Sunnis and once again created in the Sunni areas fertile fields for the planting of the seeds of extremism, essentially opening the door to the takeover of the Islamic State.

The tragedy is that political leaders failed so badly at delivering what Iraqis clearly wanted — and for that, a great deal of responsibility lies with Prime Minister Maliki.
As for the U.S. role, could all of this have been averted if we had kept 10,000 troops here? (…) I certainly wish we could have tested the proposition and kept a substantial force on the ground.
For that matter, should we have pushed harder for an alternative to PM Maliki during government formation in 2010? (…) But certainly, a different personality at the top might have made a big difference, depending, of course, on who that individual might have been.
(…) our withdrawal from Iraq in late 2011 contributed to a perception that the U.S. was pulling back from the Middle East. This perception has complicated our ability to shape developments in the region and thus to further our interests.
(…) There was certainly a sense in Washington that Iraq should be put in our rear view mirror, that whatever happened here was somewhat peripheral to our national security

Since last Autumn Tempos Interessantes has been alerting to the present nefarious role of Iran-sponsored Shiite militias and the terrible threat they represent to Iraq’s political and security future. In Who Are the Bad Guys?, (08/11/2014, at http://tempos-interessantes.blogspot.pt/2014/11/v-behaviorurldefaultvmlo.html) we pointed that:

There is a serious risk of deepening and perpetuating the sectarian hatred which will result in an ever more divided Iraq, with the Islamic State wreaking havoc in the North and the West, plus in neighbouring states, and the Shiite assuming even more absolute control of the central state and increasing its dependence on Iran.
The Middle East wars currently rage to the beat of the Sunni-Shiite confrontation and the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The United States opted for the easy target (the IS) but she will in time find out that fighting the Sunnis with the help of the Shiites in Iraq and fighting the Shiites with the help of the Sunnis in Syria is an impossible balancing act. Especially when the Bad Guys abound and there is a severe shortage of Good Guys.

This very week, Human Rights Watch has accused Shiite militias and Iraqi security forces of committing atrocities, including the erasure of 30 villages and the killing, abducting and expelling of numerous Sunni inhabitants.

And here is General Petraeus stating and stressing that the Shiite militias constitute a much more dangerous threat for Iraq and the US than the Islamic State itself:

(…) I would argue that the foremost threat to Iraq’s long-term stability and the broader regional equilibrium is not the Islamic State; rather, it is Shiite militias, many backed by — and some guided by — Iran.

(…) they have, to a degree, been both part of Iraq's salvation but also the most serious threat to the all-important effort of once again getting the Sunni Arab population in Iraq to feel that it has a stake in the success of Iraq rather than a stake in its failure. Longer term, Iranian-backed Shia militia could emerge as the preeminent power in the country, one that is outside the control of the government and instead answerable to Tehran.

(…) we need to recognize that the #1 long term threat to Iraq’s equilibrium — and the broader regional balance — is not the Islamic State (…) The most significant long term threat is that posed by the Iranian-backed Shiite militias. If Daesh is driven from Iraq and the consequence is that Iranian-backed militias emerge as the most powerful force in the country — eclipsing the Iraqi Security Forces, much as Hezbollah does in Lebanon — that would be a very harmful outcome for Iraqi stability and sovereignty, not to mention our own national interests in the region.

In two posts in June 2014, Geopolítica Passiva ou Dynamic Balance of Power, (20/06/2014 at http://tempos-interessantes.blogspot.pt/2014/06/geopolitica-passiva-ou-dynamic-balance.html ) and in February 2015, Quem Manda no Iraque (28/02/2015) at http://tempos-interessantes.blogspot.pt/2015/02/quem-manda-no-iraque.html ), it was pointed out that Iran is the major geopolitical threat to the United States’ interests, not to mention those of her allies, in the Middle East.
It is quite obvious that the USA has been playing Iran’s game in the Middle East, actively helping her to consolidate her hegemony over Iran with the pretext of fighting the Islamic State. General Petraeus in this interview, very explicitly underscores how he views Iran’s role in the Middle East:
The current Iranian regime is not our ally in the Middle East. It is ultimately part of the problem, not the solution. The more the Iranians are seen to be dominating the region, the more it is going to inflame Sunni radicalism and fuel the rise of groups like the Islamic State. While the U.S. and Iran may have convergent interests in the defeat of Daesh, our interests generally diverge. The Iranian response to the open hand offered by the U.S. has not been encouraging.

Iranian power in the Middle East is thus a double problem. It is foremost problematic because it is deeply hostile to us and our friends. But it is also dangerous because, the more it is felt, the more it sets off reactions that are also harmful to our interests — Sunni radicalism and, if we aren't careful, the prospect of nuclear proliferation as well.
It is frankly surprising to me that this is not recognised by most analysts. Iran is playing with a vulnerable hand and is, nonetheless scoring points in multiple chessboards: Iraq, nuclear programme, sanctions, Syria, Yemen and the Middle East balance of power.

General Petraeus sees and understands what is happening in Iraq. Even I can see and understand what is happening in Iraq. The Israelis, the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Emiratis see it too. Not the Obama administration, blindfolded as it is in its quest to get a signature on a dubious piece of paper.























This (unsurprising) description of this savage behaviour by the Shiite militias begs the question? What is the Coalition doing? What does it expect to accomplish?

It is clear that, if continued, this pattern will only aggravate the sectarian nature of the fight, making the Shiite forces the Islamic State’s best recruiter. And a deeply entrenched sectarian conflict will be relished by the IS, because sectarian strife is embedded at the core of its ideology and beliefs.

It is time for the United States government and its Western allies to acknowledge they are dealing with two rattlesnakes and leveraging one to strike at the other will likely bring a strong backlash in the near future.

There is a serious risk of deepening and perpetuating the sectarian hatred which will result in an ever more divided Iraq, with the Islamic State wreaking havoc in the North and the West, plus in neighbouring states, and the Shiite assuming even more absolute control of the central state and increasing its dependence on Iran.

The Middle East wars currently rage to the beat of the Sunni-Shiite confrontation and the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The United States opted for the easy target (the IS) but she will in time find out that fighting the Sunnis with the help of the Shiites in Iraq and fighting the Shiites with the help of the Sunnis in Syria is an impossible balancing act. Especially when the Bad Guys abound and there is a severe shortage of Good Guys.



* “The Washington Post”, For Iraq’s Sunnis, sectarian militias pose an extra threat at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/for-iraqs-sunnis-sectarian-militias-pose-an-extra-threat/2014/10/24/ed53540e-5b75-11e4-b812-38518ae74c67_story.html