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25 maio, 2020

Paz Violenta


PAZ VIOLENTA

 
Military situation, as of 2019   Under control of the Afghan government and NATO   Under control of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Allies

Em 29 de Fevereiro do corrente ano, os Estados Unidos e o Emirato Islâmico do Afeganistão, mais conhecido e reconhecido como os Taliban, assinaram em Doha, no Qatar, um Acordo de Paz para o Afeganistão (“Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan”).

Os pontos fundamentais do Acordo são:

1- Garantias de que o Afeganistão não será usado como plataforma para desencadear ataques contra os EUA ou os seus aliados.
2- Garantir a retirada gradual, ao longo de 14 meses, das tropas dos EUA e da NATO estacionadas no Afeganistão.
3- Um cessar-fogo abrangente e permanente entre as partes.
4- O desencadear de conversações de paz entre o governo do Afeganistão e os Taliban, envolvendo uma gradual libertação de prisioneiros por ambas as partes.

As medidas relativas à retirada militar, à troca de prisioneiros, às negociações intra-afegãs e ao levantamento de sanções são todas calendarizadas de molde ao processo estar finalizado no primeiro semestre de 2021.

Contudo, passar das palavras, mesmo que escritas e subscritas, aos actos, vai uma distância considerável. Na realidade, os únicos itens que estão efectivamente em execução são a cessação de ataques dos Taliban aos militares dos EUA e da NATO e a primeira fase da retirada desses mesmos militares do Afeganistão.

Os pontos de desentendimento são:

1- Os Estados Unidos querem executar a total retirada do Afeganistão e pôr um fim a um envolvimento militar no país que dura há quase duas décadas.
2- Os Taliban sabem-no e não vão provocar os Americanos, mas continuam a agredir o Exército Afegão (ANDSF - Afghan National Defence and Security Force) e a protelar as negociações com Cabul enquanto que se vai aproximando o timing da retirada.
3- O governo afegão vem-se debatendo com o confronto político entre o Presidente Ashraf Ghani e o perdedor das presidenciais, Abdullah Abdullah. A querela ficou recentemente resolvida, mas, entretanto, foram desbaratados mais de dois meses, gastos num impasse político e na passividade perante a agressão dos Taliban.
4- O governo do Afeganistão e os Taliban não se entendem no que respeita a libertação de prisioneiros por ambas as partes.

Resumindo:

Os Estados Unidos querem sair e estão dispostos a temporizar a sua reacção à agressividade dos Taliban para não desperdiçar ou pôr em cheque o seu desiderato de sair do Afeganistão.

Os Taliban, aproveitam a ambivalência americana para intensificar os ataques contra o exército afegão: mais de trezentos ataques apenas na segunda metade de Março. Embora os militares dos EUA continuem a bombardear os Taliban em apoio do ANDSF, os Taliban parecem pensar que vale a pena aumentar a pressão sobre o governo, provavelmente tentando entrar em negociações com uma posição fortalecida.

Os Taliban ainda não assumiram de forma pública e inequívoca o rompimento com a Al Qaeda e outros grupos terroristas, condição sine qua non do Acordo de Fevereiro.

O Governo Afegão aceitou algo contrariado a troca de prisioneiros e adoptou uma postura defensiva perante os ataques dos Taliban. Um ataque a uma maternidade de Cabul que deixou 24 mortos e 16 feridos levou o Presidente Ghani, finalmente, a decidir que o ANDSF passasse para a ofensiva.

O cenário está, portanto, revestido de incertezas, geradoras de desconfiança e potenciadoras de conflito. Entre desentendimentos, o crescendo de violência e as negociações paradas, o futuro do Afeganistão afigura-se cada vez mais lúgubre num cenário de Paz Violenta.

28 abril, 2020

Just Leave Iraq


JUST LEAVE IRAQ

 
United States military bases in the Middle East.

The United States has been militarily present in Iraq for the better part of this century: 14 years out of 20 (2003-2011 and 2014-2020). This extended presence included the involvement in a war, in a counter-insurgency, in another war and presently in another counter-insurgency/war of attrition, at a staggering cost of 2 trillion Dollars and the loss of 4487 military personnel.

The initial intentions of toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime, implementing a democracy in Iraq and unveiling weapons of arms of mass destruction (which were nowhere to be found), gradually unravelled under the mismanagement of the occupation, the insurgency of Iraqi Iranian proxies, the fight of the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda and the increasing sectarianism, eventually mitigated by the 2007 Surge approved by President George W. Bush and led by the General David Petraeus.

Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw from Iraq in 2011 was the equivalent to handing Iraq to Iran in a wrapped paper. The void left in the wake of the American withdrawal was quickly filled by Tehran, either directly through the Islamic Republican Guard (IRGC) Quds Force, or indirectly through the plethora of Iraqi militias loyal to Iran (Badr Organisation, Ketaib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, among others). Concurrently, has Iran also increased her influence over the powers that be, including the Iraqi government led by Nouri Al Maliki. Speaking of whom, Al Maliki’s power grew with Tehran’s backing and with it came an increasing sectarianism and persecution of the Sunni citizens that paved the way for the following Islamic State onslaught.

Fast forward to 2014, the United States is drawn back to Iraq because of the establishment of the Caliphate by the Islamic State (IS) in large swaths of Iraq and Syria. The United States’ intervention, plus her allies and the support given to the collapsing Iraqi army, were instrumental in the defeat of the Islamic State.

The USA remained in Syria and in Iraq, under the pretext of continuing to fight the remains of the IS and, in the case of Iraq, also to provide training to her security forces. In Iraq there are an estimated 5200 American troops spread by 5 bases, down from the 9 they had at the beginning of this year. The reason to deliver some bases to the Iraqi military is the need to consolidate, but the increase in rocket attacks on American bases and the need to upgrade the bases’ defence capabilities obviously have played a role in the decision.

Given the long American history in Iraq, its financial cost, its human toll and the scant political and geopolitical gains, it is high time to consider if the United States should persist in her Iraqi quest, or should she just call it a day, fold the bases, the equipment and make the troops go home?

The mainstream opinion is that the USA should stick to Iraq. Actually, it argues that the USA should upgrade her involvement in Iraq, helping the country to attain the capability to fend off threats from neighbours like Iran or Turkey, to prop up Iraq’s economy, to help establishing a standard of good governance and to finish off the vicious circles of endless corruption and bloody sectarianism. On top of these, the USA should also accomplish the feat of brushing aside 15 years of Iranian public and covert influence over Baghdad’s political apparatus, plus putting an end to Iran’s control over countless powerful proxy militias, not to mention her direct military and security involvement in Iraq.

My personal conviction is that the United States is over and done in Iraq and she is actually overstaying there. There are at least seven reasons to substantiate it.

1- The past 15 years abundantly proved that the United States is not able to quash Iran’s influence and ascendant over Iraq. The US has extended a decisive contribution to root out the Islamic State threat and power and yet, after its demise, Iran went back to show her prominence as influencer-in-chief in Baghdad. The American bases in Iraq have been frequently attacked by Iran’s proxy militias. Regardless, the Iraqi parliament approved a non-binding resolution to expel all American troops in Iraq. This, by itself, speaks volumes as to who really calls the shots from behind the scenes.

2- The degree of suggested American involvement in Iraq would entail another huge investment, on the military-security level, on the financial and infra-structure level, on the political and diplomatic level. And all for what? Been there, done that, as they say. The odds that this plan would pan out are diminutive, given the well-established and time-tested Iranian pervasive influence in Baghdad.

3- The American citizenry is increasingly fed up of the excessive US military involvement in the Middle East, of the human toll endured and of the financial burden, as well. As time goes by and the results do not match the investments, the animosity towards the endeavour in Iraq will only grow.

4- Unlike the mainstream conviction, I do not buy into the idea that having a close relationship with Iraq is of crucial national interest to the United States. Besides the unlikelihood of Iraq switching sides, the fact is that the USA would not gain a significant new leverage in the Middle East if she could co-opt Iraq. Although keeping Iraq under Iran’s wing will enable the latter an extended influence in the region, thus preserving the Shiite Arch Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon, there is no reason to believe that it would translate into an overarching and threatening clout across the Middle East.

 
 Iran’s Shiite Arch stretching from the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, crossing Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
in “STRATFOR” at www.stratfor.com


 5- Actually, in this Shiite Arch scenario, Iran will be bracing with severe challenges in the mid-term if not before. Iran would find herself struggling to manage and control a group of countries who are themselves ensnared in multiple problems of epic proportions. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are all mired in sectarian conflicts, in terrorist and militia warfare, subject to multiple foreign meddling (Turkey, Russia, USA, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates), undergoing severe economic crises and coping with widespread infrastructure destruction due to warfare, in the case of Syria and Iraq. If one thinks of the strained conditions of the Iranian economy due to foreign adventurism, sanctions, bad management and corruption, it is not difficult to figure that Iran would be utterly incapable of rescuing her allies and proxies.

6- What about an eventual Islamic State resurgence or any other insurgency by existing or new terrorist organisations, be them Sunni or Shiite? Well, on the one hand, it is unlikely that the IS would be able to return to the level of power and impetus it displayed in 2014/15 and the same applies to any other terrorist or insurgent group. On the other hand, if Iraq faces renewed threats from any such organisation, guess who would have to carry the burden of rescuing the Iraqi government? Yes, that will be Iran.

7- Last but not least, the United States faces other challenges that are much more relevant to her national interest and which request much more attention and commitment. Namely, the rising military power and geopolitical ambitions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Having 70.000 troops allocated to the Middle East plus the large amount of sea, air and land equipment deployed is a bit of a waste when there is an insufficient military presence in the West Pacific. The USA should not and will not withdraw from the Middle East, but she should have a lighter footprint and terminate the useless and vulnerable land deployments, such as those in Iraq and Syria.

It is quite surprising to see that there is still a cohort of analysts and experts who keep pressing Washington to engage in never-ending nation-building endeavours in spite of the successive failures in previous attempts. It is also bewildering that these same people seem to think that the United States should have a very close relationship with any country, even if they are of little or none geopolitical relevance and/or if the large required investment and the expectable small return clearly do not pay off the costs and risks involved.

No suggestion is being made fore the US to leave the Middle East and bases like the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and the Naval Support Activity in Bahrain, among others, are absolutely vital for American power projection and its presence in the region and the adjacent seas.

However, if the United States aims to retain her role as the most important  world power, she has to drop world micromanagement and to focus on the real game changing challenges which, at present, mostly involve the Asia-Pacific region in general and the PRC in particular.
China’s outrageous maritime claims.
in “STRATFOR” at www.stratfor.com